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CAPITAL MARKETS AND E-FRAUD
1 




The technological dependency of securities exchanges upon internet based (IP) platforms has 
dramatically increased the industry’s exposure to reputation, market and operational risks.  In 
addition, the convergence of several innovations in the market are adding stress to these systems. 
These innovations affect everything from software to system design and architecture. These 
include the use of XML as the industry IP language, STP or straight through processing of data, 
pervasive or diffuse computing and grid computing as well as the increased use of Internet and 
wireless.  The fraud is not new, rather, the magnitude and speed by which fraud can be 
committed has grown exponentially due to the convergence of once private networks online. 
It is imperative that senior management of securities markets and brokerage houses be properly 
informed of the negative externalities associated with e-brokerage and the possible critical points 
of failure that exist in today’s digitized financial sector as they grow tomorrow’s exchanges.  The 
overwhelming issues regarding e-finance is to determine the true level of understanding that 
senior management has about online platforms, including the inherent risks and the depth of the 
need to use it wisely. This policy note will attempt to highlight the various risks that have been 
magnified by the increasing digitalization of processes within the brokerage arena and explain 
the need for concerted research and analysis of these as well as the profound consequences that 
may entail without proper planning.  An effective legal, regulatory and enforcement framework 
is essential for creating the right incentive structure for market participants.  The legal and 
regulatory framework should focus on the improvement of internal monitoring of risks and 
vulnerabilities, greater information sharing about these risks and vulnerabilities, education and 
training on the care and use of these technologies and better reporting of risks and responses. 
Public/private partnerships and collaborations also are needed to create an electronic commerce 
(e-commerce) environment that is safe and sound.  Section I of the working paper, attempts to 
provide a background as to the adoption of technology in capital markets.  Section II is an 
overview of 7 case studies in e-fraud perpetuated within capital markets and the various 
operational risks of utilizing IP based networks.  Section III provides the conclusion and 







                                                 
1 Authored by Tom Kellermann and Valerie McNevin 2004.  The Authors would like to thank Gerard Caprio,  Jim 
Nelms, Shrimadt Tripathy, Yumi Nishiyama, Thomas Glaessner and Ernesto Revilla for their valuable insights and 
written contributions.  
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I.  Introduction and Background 
 
On October 14
th,2004 New York Federal Reserve President Timothy Geithner
2 stated: 
 
 "The increased risk of terrorist attacks and increased sophistication of cyber-attacks on 
electronic networks have added new dimensions to the traditional concerns of safety and 
soundness and operational resilience," he told a financial services conference in Atlanta.  
Geithner said the growing challenge of cyber-attacks will require a "major ongoing commitment 
of resources". “Beyond the direct financial losses from criminal activity, these threats pose a 
broader risk to confidence in the integrity of financial institutions, payments systems and, 
ultimately, the global payments network,” he said. 
 
All financial institutions are facing this critical operational risk.  Geithner’s statements echo the 
warnings made by law enforcement entities for the past 5 years. Operation Uptick
3 was the 
largest securities fraud under-cover operation to date. In a ten month investigation involving the 
US Attorney’s office, the FBI and the SEC, it culminated in the arrest of over 200 people, the 
involvement of brokerage firms and a network of six organized crime families, brokerage firms, 
brokers and over $50 million in illegal proceeds. Tracking a period of more than 5 years it 
exposed a criminal enterprise that was able to bribe brokers and pension officers, compromise 
every type of market and law enforcement professional, inflate stock prices, and sell shaky 
investments through a significantly corrupted brokerage system.  Most disturbing, its prosecution 
showcased the changing business model and modus operandi for organized crime and 
foreshadows the havoc that organized crime can wreak undetected in the securities industry. 
  
The technological shift to IP based technologies has had a direct impact in the financial industry, 
most obviously in the areas of e-banking and online securities trading. E-finance penetration is 
best observed in online securities trading and internet banking
4  
 
E-finance use is increasing around the globe, including that of emerging markets. Despite the 
intrinsic weaknesses in the financial, legal, regulatory and technological infrastructures of 
emerging countries, some such as Korea, Brazil, and India have been early adopters of e-finance, 
using the new delivery channels to expand access, provide opportunities and effectively 
circumvent some of the constraints of traditional modes.  
 
In the world’s securities markets
5 according to the World Bank’s financial sector research, by 
2005, online brokerage could rise to 80 percent in industrial countries (which was around 28% at 
                                                 
2 Fed's Geithner warns of cyber-attack risk to banks. REUTERS. Thu Oct 14, 2004 02:52 PM ET. By Victoria 
Thieberger. 
 
3 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-81.txt  
4 Goldfinger, UNCTAD (2001) 
5 E-finance in securities markets include not only online brokerage but also electronic issuance and distribution of 
securities such as the Treasury Direct in the United States, where treasury securities are sold directly to the retail 
investors. Similar systems have been created in the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico etc. where e-distribution of securities 
is changing the landscape of primary markets for government securities. (Glaessner, Kantur, 2004)  
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the time of the research), and 40% in developing countries assuming that a better business and 
enabling environment is put in place
6.  
 
The trend observed in the capital markets of more industrialized countries, such as the United 
States, Western Europe and Singapore, is continued growth in the use of online trading.  In 
emerging economies, South Korea represents the high end. Since e-brokering was launched in 
Korea in 1997, the  proportion of its total trading value steadily climbed from 19 percent in 1999,  
to 43 percent in 2003. In Russia, approximately  40 percent of stocks traded on the Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) occurs via the Internet.  On the low end, in Singapore 
and Taiwan, e-brokering accounts for approximately 10 percent of total trading volume. In Chile, 
market players estimate that  5-10 percent of securities trading occurs online.  The table below 
depicts a snapshot of the growth of internet based trading in certain markets. 
 
Table I:  Penetration of Online Trading 
  1999  2003 
EU Nations  2 %  10 % 
South Korea  19%  43% 
Singapore  5%  10% 
Hungary  6%   
India   11%   
Brazil  6%   
Mexico  3%   
 
E-Finance promises many benefits to users and adopters.  First, e-finance lowers the costs of 
intermediation and increases competition in financial services. It also  expands the reach and 
scope of access to financial services by formerly unreachable clients (Claessens et-all 2001) . 
This increased penetration of e-finance in developed as well as developing countries is are also 
erasing the boundaries between finance and technology, transactions and information processing, 
and finally financial service providers and technology providers. The distinction between “e-
finance” and “finance” will become obsolete, as financial delivery assumes the use of electronic 
means. 
 
E-finance however exacts numerous costs that have not been appropriately examined. For 
example, the dependence of online backend operations has increased operational risk 
significantly.  Although transactions appear to be completed in less time, the underlying 
complexity required to handle such transactions in an automated fashion has increased 
exponentially.  As a result what we appear to achieve in terms of transactional efficiency on the 
one hand may be lost through transactional complexity on the other. 
 
Over time, it is now clear that online fraud rates for e-commerce are much higher than for those 
transactions completed via more traditional modes
7.    The anonymity and speed perpetuated by 
the internet allows for greater rates of fraud.  At present the most valid number to come forth 
                                                 
6 Claessens, Glaessner & Klingebiel. 2001.  E-finance In Emerging Markets:  Is  Leapfrogging Possible?. World 
Bank. 
7 Glaessner, Kellermann & McNevin. October  2003.  Electronic Safety and Soundness: Securing Finance in a New 
Age. World Bank.  
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from studies indicates that the online fraud rate is 83 times higher that offline. Further, it is also 
well established that the financial sector is a target of choice for online crime.
8  As a result of the 
dot com revolution, increased access to financial services cannot distinguish between rightful 
from illegal access.  
 
A fundamental principle of criminology is that crime follows opportunity.  Opportunities to 
perpetrate crime abound in today’s computer reliant world.  The financial services industry is 
now increasingly vulnerable to inappropriate manipulation and consumers are often defenseless 
with out appropriate warning whether or not they choose to transact financial activity online. The 
scope of this problem is multi-dimensional.  
 
First,  increased dependence on technology for the delivery of financial services and the 
processing and storage of financial information without an appropriate understanding of 
the network’s security or business continuity needs inordinately exposes the financial 
system to e-security risks and threatens the long-term integrity of financial transactions 
and their underlying information.  
 
Second, Internet and electronic payment systems enable providers of financial services to 
create complex financial products and services and to expand their reach  to an 
unprecedented number of people from all around the world, at much lower costs than 
ever thought possible. This opens the door to create unregulated financial products or for 
unlicensed or illegitimate entities to offer financial services with the intent to defraud 
unsophisticated consumers. 
 
II.  The Potential for E-fraud: 7 Case Studies  
 
This section describes certain risks to which capital markets are exposed in today’s online 
environment. The following are examples of ways in which hackers have compromised systems 
for illegal purposes. 
 
1.  E-brokerage Customer Compromise—Hijacking an account is a preferred method of 
compromise. By hijacking an account, the perpetrator can change the amount of shares traded 
and/or the change the time of the trades.  By breaking into a broker’s account a hacker can insert 
a Trojan to steal user names and passwords.
9  The hacker then uses this information to trade 
securities under a victim’s name.   
 
In October of 2003, Van Dinh, a 19 year old Pennsylvania man, was convicted of using a 
Trojan horse to capture the password of an investor's online account..  Nineteen-year-old 
                                                 
8 Ibid. Of the 142,000 reported electronic security incidents experienced in the United States last year over 50% 
were targeted against the financial sector. Recently the FBI has corroborated this statistic. 
9A Trojan horse program cloaks malicious code by appearing as an innocuous attachment.  Trojans are designed to 
gain covert and unlawful access to a user’s computer system. Once inside, they can rapidly reproduce and spread 
worldwide in a matter of minutes, performing damaging acts along the way including, but not limited to: stealing 
sensitive information, e-mailing information to remote hackers, and enabling remote access and control over a 
computer system.  For additional information, please see Tom Kellermann and Yumi Nishiyama, “Blended 
Electronic Security Threats: Code Red, Klez, Slammer, and Bugbear” (June 2003) and “Digital Insider:  Backdoor 
Trojans” (December 2003), World Bank.  
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Van Dinh now faces civil securities-fraud charges for  tapping into a TD Waterhouse 
account held by a 34-year-old Boston man. In the criminal case authorities proved that Van 
Dinh used the hostage account to buy put options on Cisco that effectively cut his losses on a 
losing position he carried in his own online account at Cybertrader.com.  Securities and 
Exchange Commission officials also showed that Van Dinh  used contacts made at an online 
stock-discussion forum to  encourage people to download a certain software in which he had 
inserted a Trojan horse. Van Dinh tricked victims into downloading the program. Once 
inside it monitored keystrokes, reporting these back to him, thus allowing him to learn these 
passwords and codes and obtain unauthorized access to the accounts.  
 
The victim has no coverage in the event of loss. Furthermore, though these online web sites offer 
a modicum of security through secure shopping software, there are vulnerabilities within the 
software itself that facilitate these criminal activities.  The following case starkly illustrates the 
risks that online investors face in today’s environment. It underscores the growing concern that 
trusted spaces such as discussion forums can be abused in such a way that erodes investor 
confidence, and exerts a new type of cost on investment.  
 
2.  E-broker Compromise—To brokers/traders time is always of the essence.  Competitive 
positions today can be made or lost in seconds. Trading, in particular, is an activity where 
performance is dependent on being seamlessly connected to the  “trading floor” at all times.  
With the growth in global wireless connectivity, many if not most traders and brokers utilize 
WIFI or GSM protocols to facilitate remote access.  Although it provides  real-time access to the 
trader it also provides a means whereby hackers can exploit weaknesses in wireless 
communication signals to obtain real-time critical intelligence information and/or manipulate 
trades—See Diagram A. 
 
Diagram A:  Wirelessly Enabled Straight-Through Processing 
  
     















Source: Samuel Gaer, CIO, New York Mercantile Exchange, July 2004 Presentation. 
 
As illustrated above, the New York Mercantile Exchange, is developing a Wireless Straight 
Through Processing System (refer to Appendix C).  According to Mr. Gaer, CIO for the 
Exchange, such a system will: 1) Ensure order information is clear and accurate 2) Increase 
customer control 3)  Guarantee the trade immediate entry into clearing   4)  Guarantee instant 
order and status assignment information  5) Lower overall transaction costs due to fewer errors 
and paper supply and lastly, 6) Increase a trader’s volume and performance.  Although these six 
elements are characterized as benefits, deeper analysis reveals that such a system carries high 
administrative and security risks, which in turn requires investing in substantial human and 
technological resources at significant cost.  
 
The expanding use of wireless and satellite systems for financial transactions represents a 
growing  vulnerability.  Such systems often run with little security, leaving the communications 
vehicle wide open to both techno-terrorist and criminal attacks. Technology creates the 
possibility for crimes of great magnitude and complexity to be committed very quickly.   
For example, assume that a brokerage house transfers data over a T1 fiber optic line. That line 
can transfer approximately 154KB/sec or 9.2MB/min. once all of the packet buffering, etc is in  
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place.  Now two questions must be asked--how much time does it take to steal the information 
and how much is the stolen information worth?   Assume there is a total denial of service for 9 
minutes. The answer is that the brokerage entity would be out of business.  
 
Moreover, the more distributed a network is, the more vulnerable it is to interception and 
unauthorized access.  Take for example, the system in Diagram A. This system exhibits four 
inherent weaknesses in its architecture:  1)  The wireless trading pad running the “Epit 
application” can be hijacked by a Trojan horse or spyware can be inserted into the 
communication while in transit from its point of origin to its destination.  2)  The Wireless 
Server/Access point is an easy entry point.  3) The NYME WLAN is susceptible to rogue access 
points and devices unless frequent audits are conducted for such intruders and  4)   The end 
customer is using the Internet to communicate desired trades into this “secure system”  the 




There are ways to mitigate most of these operational risks. Application security, active content 
filtering, security for pervasive or diffuse computing and grid computing will be critical as will 
real-time configuration management.  The widespread adoption of wireless local area networks 
(WIFI)  are but one example of the convergence of modern telecommunications and IT systems 
which become open to interception.  The popularity of wireless systems (both satellite and 
terrestrial wireless) has continued to increase.  This spread of the technology often coupled with 
the lack of implementation of certain safeguards for systems
11, creates a serious risk, making 
wireless systems inherently vulnerable to being breached.  Although Straight Through 
Processing (STP) coupled with XML and T + O appears to provide optimal efficiency, if fraud is 
committed there is no recourse in the settlement window. Unwinding is impossible in the 
traditional sense in a T + O environment. Today’s settlement paradigm and its safeguards should 
be reviewed as the goal to operate in a T + 0 environment redistributes the risk of disputes about 
settlement to after the fact rather than trying to resolve such prior to settlement. By redistributing 
risk, the very nature of the contract changes and this in turn should impact cost and price 
calculations. 
 
The issues posed by these innovations are not just the result of architecture and configuration but 
also result from how today’s market defines efficiency and effectiveness. Inherently the 
securities market is different than banking. In banking, safety and soundness are primary, but 
securities is about assuring that investors are aware of and understands the investment risk. Now 
the question is whether the investor is adequately educated about the operational risk of the 
vehicle used to place the trade not just the market risk of the underlying security being traded.  
Arguably in the securities market if an investor knowingly chooses to use a riskier means of 
trading that’s acceptable, the question then is whether the broker or trader has adequately advised 
                                                 
10 Although applications are being developed according to common criteria e.g. www.wapforum.org  .  Many 
security gaps exist in both the procedural areas and technical areas if implementation per secure wireless 
networking. 
 
11 For best practice per securing WLANs, GSM, GPRS and GPS please refer to the Technology Risk Checklist. 
World Bank. October  2004.  
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the investor of this risk or should they be permitted to use riskier means to trade without their 
client’s knowledge and if so who bears the burden of any loss that may result. 
 
3.  Distributed Denial Of  Service (DDOS) attack
12—DDOS attacks could take several forms. 
First a hacker may attempt to flood (overwhelm the network with vast amounts of data) a 
brokerage company’s network just before the close of market, to prevent it from placing fresh 
quotes before the end of the day. This could result in penalties and subsequent “reputational 
risk”. In a delivery vs. payment scenario the stock is not transferred to the buyer until payment is 
received. If payment orders are kept from being delivered then the stock will not transfer. In an 
Straight Through Processing (STP),TP, T + 0 environment this scenario carries significantly 
more risk.  This scenario is particularly plausible in the New York Stock Exchange’s new 
wireless trading model. Although the Exchange uses fiber optics as its primary transfer channel, 
it has installed a WLAN (wireless local asynchronous network) to serve as the redundant backup 
for those lines in the event of another terrorist strike.  Unfortunately using the WLAN poses a 
significant vulnerability to the integrity of the stored market data. Or the hacker may cause the 
system to fail to respond to a time-based transaction(s) or a trade(s). For example, a system 
overload/failure, could delay the response time and cause a Call Option to be placed after its 
expiry date. Who is liable for a failed trade in that situation? 
 
4.  Market Data Sabotage—Market participants are heavily reliant upon the market data they 
receive from entities like Bloomberg’s and/or Reuters as well as online chat rooms and 
discussion forums. Hackers have the potential to corrupt the data or insert erroneous data once it 
leaves the perimeters of financial information disseminators and aggregators such as 
Bloomberg’s and Reuters. The integrity of the data can thus be called into question because it 
can be digitally manipulated.  Since trading positions often are directly related to the 
interpretation of such data such error could result in loss of investor confidence or even panic 
once discovered. As importantly, chat rooms and discussion forums are fertile areas for 
manipulators to deposit disinformation. Because this can be done anonymously, quickly and with 
little if any opportunity to investigate in a timely manner there is little chance that such an event 
would ever be prosecuted. 
 
5.  Currency Trading Scenario—Currency trading is volatile and is more often than not 
dependent on fractions of seconds in trading positions.  Suppose that the Euro drops in value 
relative to US dollars effective at 12:00:00 EST on a particular day.  The holder of Euros is 
likely to wish that they had sold Euros before its drop in value.  Suppose that the server time 
tagging the buy/sell orders is being controlled by the reception of GPS positioning and timing 
signals.  A GPS electronic spoofing attack could be launched against the GPS time controlled 
transaction server.  In order to “back-date” the sell order to show that it occurred before the 
Euros decline, the attacker alters the GPS timing (for example, 11:59:50 EST) thereby causing 
the system to order the sale and time stamp at a time prior to the decline in the Euros value.  The 
                                                 
12 A type of electronic attack in which malicious code is used to execute any type of system overflow or jam, 
thereby causing the server to shut down and deny service to its users. 
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electronic attacker then turns off the GPS spoofing signal and the GPS timing system once again 
receives the real GPS signal and returns to the correct time in the server.
13 
 
6.  Insider Trading/dealing---Insider trading occurs when a broker or trader takes a position 
with respect to securities based on certain information obtained before it is made public. The 
Internet facilitates “insider trading” in numerous ways.  E-mail and instant messaging programs  
on a trader/brokers computers can be compromised fairly easily.  Trojans
14 and worms can be 
used to siphon material data from an insider’s computer and transmitted to an outside party. For 
example Backdoor.Tkbot, by definition an IRC
15 Trojan has the capability to perform  nefarious 
activities such as to “gather user/system information”, upload a file to the victim's system, or 
download a file from the victim's system. The use of wireless devices by traders increases the 
potential for market manipulation due to the use of unsecured WLANs, GPRS, GSM and 
CDMA
16. Criminals from outside the “secure enclave”  of the trading floor can attack these 
devices and compromise them thus hijacking the markets for illicit gain. The relative physical 
security provided by the modern trading floor is bypassed by the wireless transmission of 
financial data throughout the facility and beyond. 
 
7.  Centralized Depository Attack-- Centralized depository, clearing and settlement services 
for equity and debt markets have been established in many countries over the  past 5 years. The 
typical CDS provides its services with an online computer system with participants having direct 
online access to the system. Transfer of settlement funds occurs through the central bank the 
same-day funds. Here is an example of regulation and technology design in supervised arenas 
not keeping pace with best practice. Since 9-11, a distributed network with significant 
redundancies is considered best practice. However the debate continues. Pushing forward with a 
consolidated platform given the significant concerns is not wise and the pros and cons should be 
looked at dispassionately and with great care. If a consolidated platform is used  since this is the 
delta of the settlement and clearance functions these facilities must maintain maximum security. 
The issues here are design and function, as well as centralizing high value assets. These are 
complicated issues. So how does one design a central depository system that is connected to the 
Internet or open network with sufficient back up, resilience, robustness and safeguards to 
mitigate the potential of compromising a critical point of failure.  Staged  cyber-attacks are now 
feasible in most countries due to the reality that CDS’ are built within the Internet Protocol (IP) 
environment.  The potential for reputational, operational and even systemic risks associated with 
poor non-layered security arrangements
17 upon these institutions is high.  
 
Over the past few years cyber attacks have grown in complexity, sophistication and now 
represent powerful forms of targeted customized economic weapons that can destroy critical 
databases and render serious financial harm in an incredibly short amount of time.  As countries 
work to create stock exchanges and central depositories, it is imperative to chronicle the lessons 
                                                 
13 Although this is possible the effects of doing so are not yet known. 
14 A malicious program such as a virus or a worm, hidden in an innocent-looking piece of software, usually for the 
purpose of unauthorized collection, alteration, or destruction of information. 
15 IRC a.k.a.  Internet Relay Chat 
16 For additional information, please see Tom Kellermann, Mobile Risk Management, World Bank March 2002. 
17 The World Bank’s Technology Risk Checklist v. 8.2 attempts to highlight the 12 layers of proper network 
security in detail.  
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learned so that these can be passed on and incorporated into new designs for the IT systems as 
well as the supporting legal, regulatory and policy infrastructure.  
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Table II:  Select Case Studies of Hacking Attacks  
 
Date    Location  Fraudster    M.O. 






Hackers created a website for the 
fictitious International Brokerage 
Association, copying the SIPC’s web 
content to confuse investors into thinking 
the fraudulent website was legit.
18 
Oct 2003  Stock market  Van Dinh  Dinh used keystroke loggers to steal U.S. 
brokerage firm customer accounts, and 
then used a victim’s account identity as a 




Bloomberg L.P.  Oleg Zezev  Zezev acquired access to customer 
financial data and attempted to extort 
$200,000.
20 
2002  H&R Block  Ivy Johnson, 
former H&R Block 
manager 
The former H&R Block manager has been 
charged with mail and credit card fraud, 
for the identity theft of at least 27 
customers.
 21 




Hackers penetrated a bank’s security 
system and illegally sold 5 million shares 
of Delta Information and 











Duronio detonated a “logic bomb” 
program that caused more than $3 million 







Louis Lebaga  $158 million—Lebaga was apprehended 
only after attempting to steal $1.3 billion 







Pvt. Ltd., share 






Sheth and Pabari gained access to the 
Bombay Online Trading System (BOLT) 
with Sheth’s trader ID and password 
issued by SSKI. The two then 
manipulated stock prices by utilizing their 
                                                 
18 Associated Press, “Federal Web site copied in apparent fraud,” accessed on 17 June 2004 at 
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/7828271.htm .  
19 BBC News, “US Hacker Accused of Massive Fraud”, accessed on 10 Oct 2003 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3180358.stm. 
20 U.S. Dept. of Justice, “Kazakhstan Hacker Sentenced to Four Years Prison for Breaking into Bloomberg Systems 
and Attempting Extortion,” accessed on 21 June 2004 at  http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/zezevSent.htm  
21 The New York Times http://nytimes.com/2003/01/03/nyregion/03THEF.html 
22 BBC News, “South Korea probes online dealing fraud,”  8/26/2002, accessed at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2217584.stm>. 
23 CBS News, “‘Logic Bomb’ Dropped On Brokerage,” accessed on 21 June 2004 at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/18/tech/main533450.shtml.  
24 The National Infrastructure Protection Center reported that the worm was distributed from unknown sources and 
is said to have disrupted and infiltrated networks worldwide. www.zdnet.com.  
     













Chang Shian-tang  NT$10 million—Chang Shian-tang used 
decoding software to steal the passwords 
and personal information of more than 
2,000 customers; apprehended after the 
brokerage companies complained of 







Abelkader Smires  Denial-of-service attacks that caused 
major disruption of trading on the 
NASDAQ.
27 
1999  ETrade Group 





Denial-of-service attacks that caused 







Zhao Zhe  Changed 5 transaction records, causing 
turnover of 2 stocks to rise drastically and 






1.  Investment Scams 
In the US and South Korea, where the penetration of e-finance in the capital markets have been 
the most wide-spread, seven out of the “top ten securities frauds” involve online investment 
scams. 
 
 Investment Scams are investment schemes created by illegitimate intermediaries to collect 
funds from inexperienced and small investors with false promises of extremely high returns in a 
very short time with little or no risk. Through the use of electronic means such as the Internet for 
securities transactions or dissemination of information, these individuals enjoy the advantages of 




Promissory notes scams or prime bank notes are investor scams that involve schemes where 
investors are told that they have access to "secret" trading programs that only a few privileged 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 The Cyber Crime Investigation Cell of the Criminal Investigation Department in Mumbai (Bombay), India 
reported this first instance of online security fraud investigated by the cell. 
http://www.cybercellmumbai.com/Cyber%20Crime%20News/crimenews.htm .  
26 The Taipaei Times, “Hacker Arrested for Online Trading Scam,” accessed on 17 June 2004 at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/archives/2001/07/03/0000092498. 
27 National Infrastructure Protection Center Major Investigations Web site: www.nipc.gov. 
28 USA Today, “Los Alamos employee may have history of hacking,” accessed on 17 June 2004 at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-01-26-los-alamos-hacker.htm .  
29 Nando Times, “China Jails Hacker for 3 Years,” accessed on 21 June 2004 at http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-
archive/1999/Nov/0029.html  
30 See http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm  
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people will be invited to take part in. The scheme promises access to the trading of certain bank 
securities such as bank guarantees, notes, stocks, or debentures at a discount price and sell them 
at a premium. Investors are then asked to sign "non-disclosure " agreements which prevent them 
from talking about the deal with anyone, including a lawyer or financial advisor. Investors are 
asked to ensure their funds are "good, clean and clear of criminal origin". The notes usually 
claim to be guaranteed by a well-known bank. In some variations of this scam, the investor is 
instructed to send money to a foreign bank, for example in the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, or 
the Isle of Man. Later, the money is transferred to an offshore account controlled by the con 
artist. 
 
2.  Online Investment newsletters and e-mail spams 
While the Internet, when properly used can be an effective tool for legitimate research providers 
in giving investment advice and disseminating unbiased information about the market, it also 
provides a venue for securities “touting” or market manipulations. Hundreds of online 
investment newsletters are published on scores of internet sites. The most common fraudulent 
activity using online newsletters is where an investor manipulates a stock’s price upward by 
widely disseminating false news about the stock or the issuing company and then trading the 
stock to profit from the manipulated price. The same effect can be obtained by using e-mail or 
IM (instant messaging), where the manipulator sends a mass e-mail with “investment tips”, 
which then causes an investor to buy thus artificially inflating the price of the stock. This is also 
referred to as called “pumping and dumping of stocks”.     
 
An economical means of choice for pumping and dumping stocks on a mass scale is spam.  In 
the UK, according to spam-detection specialist ClearSwift, the number of spammed stock tips 
has risen more than 300 percent between December and March of 2004, which translates into 
thousands of bogus investment tips on a variety of obscure firms listed on exchanges around the 
world reaching a significant audience of small investors through e-mail. A spammed e-mail 
usually consists of millions of potential recipients. 
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3.  Fraud through Social Engineering
31  
 
Impersonation of a credible entity on bulletin boards or a discussion forum can lead to leakage of 
vital information. It could also be the source for unwarranted malicious knowledge which can 
negatively affect the trader’s decision making process. Decisions by traders can now be affected 
by manipulated through the impersonation a.k.a. spoofing
32 of legitimate sources of information 
i.e. websites and email address.  
                                                 
31  In her book, “Information Warfare and Security”, Dorothy Denning defines ‘social engineering’ as:  
“…operations that trick others into doing something they would not do if they knew the truth, for example, giving 
out a secret password or sensitive corporate information. Any medium that provides one-to-one communications 
between people can be exploited. All that it takes is to be a good liar.” (pgs. 111-112). 
 
32 Brand spoofing--Hackers will fake or spoof websites of legitimate and existing organizations, in order to deceive 
the customer into thinking they are interacting with the legitimate company.  Customers submit sensitive 
information such as user identification numbers, passwords, credit card numbers, bank account information, and 
other forms of financial data. Customers do so, unknowing that this information is going into illicit hands.  This type 
of social engineering can involve a digital communication (e.g., e-mail) that contains a link to a website.  Once the 
customer clicks on the link, (s)he is redirected to a fraudulent website.  When a customer is lured to the website, 
their information and/or money is stolen from them through digital means.  Industry spoofing--Fake or spoofed 
organizations or industries that purportedly exist to mitigate risks, such as escrows and other third party mediators, 
that customers are socialized into trusting. 
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III.  Conclusions and Predictions for Further Research  
 
The convergence of certain innovations in the securities market over the past decade is fostering 
a fertile environment for fraud,  increasing operational risk and are amplifying the potential for 
systemic failure. By utilizing E-platforms, brokers can reduce costs and barriers to market 
participants but increase the probability of investor fraud. “Buyer beware” takes on significantly 
new meaning in the online, 24 x 7 environment. E-brokering coupled with the use of unsecured 
wireless devices by traders and those in the pit are indicative of the new kinds of operational 
risks that should be understood, analyzed and mitigated before they are incorporated into a 
business architecture. Certain costs and risks associated with the e-finance revolution have yet to 
be fully appreciated.   Recently, technologists have published books which state that not all 
information or transactions belong in the online world. Decisions to put any information online 
should be made in a reasonably prudent manner after a thorough risk benefit analysis and 
awareness of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities inherent in the system. 
 
The monograph Electronic Safety and Soundness presented a four pillar framework for policy 
makers in emerging markets to use in designing responses to the challenge of assuring electronic 
safety and soundness of their financial systems.  As such, this monograph focuses in part on 
technological solutions; depicted within the architecture of the 12 layer matrix
33, but more 
importantly on the incentives of the many parties involved to assure the security of critical 
infrastructures ranging from telecommunications and financial sector service providers to the 
government as well as to final consumers of financial or other services.   
 
Securing the open network is first and foremost the responsibility of the service providers.  
Businesses need to understand the risks and responsibilities of providing services via these 
channels and seek continuous improvement in maintaining e-security.  Technology is only a part 
of the solution; sound business principles such as responsibility, accountability and trust are also 
essential to building infrastructure and a framework that can support e-business.   
 
 
Utilizing Electronic Safety and Soundness as a foundation and methodology for further 
research, the authors of this white paper will attempt to discern the patterns of e-fraud and the 
operational risks experienced by capital markets and offer recommendations for legal, regulatory 
and technological safeguards that should be put in place to foster trust and confidence 
particularly in emerging capital markets.   
                                                 
33 Specific layers range from the need to have a Chief Information Security Officer and an incident response plan, to 
finding the most appropriate type of firewall and encryptions systems.  For more details refer to Appendix E. 
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Appendix A: Top Ten Traditional Investment Frauds
34 
 
According to a 2002 report by Kansas Securities Commissioner David Brant, in conjunction with 
the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), the list of “Top Ten” 
Investment frauds that the securities commissioners are fighting are: 
1.  Unlicensed individuals engaging in securities activities: Unlicensed individuals often engage 
in securities market activities with insufficient credentials and disclosure. These individuals 
are also the ones who create and market investment scams where they collect funds from 
unsophisticated investors with false promises of high returns, and disappear with these funds 
or lose them in the market.   
2.  Unscrupulous stockbrokers: Brokers that are registered by the securities regulator also 
engage in fraudulent activities, such as “front running” and insider dealing.  
3.  Analyst research conflict:.
35  This includes analysts issuing overly positive research reports 
and making positive recommendations in order to win investment banking business for their 
firm.  
4.  Promissory notes schemes: These are short-term debt instruments issued by little-known or 
non-existent companies promising high returns with little or no risk.  
5.  Prime banks: These involve scammers promising investors triple-digit returns through access 
to the investment portfolios of the world’s elite banks. They mainly target illegal groups of 
investors (like terrorist organizations) who wish to achieve high returns under strict secrecy. 
6.  Viatical settlements: These involve sale of death benefits by terminally ill patents to third 
parties where the insured gets a percentage of the death benefit in cash and investors get a 
share of the death benefit when the insured dies. These contracts are often bundled to be 
resold to unsophisticated investors. These are highly risky investments and generally are not 
regulated and are illegal.  
7.  Affinity fraud: These include scams that use potential investor’s religious or ethnic identity to 
gain their trust and then steal their savings with false promises of high returns.  
8.  Charitable gift annuities: In some cases, it is a legal investment to sell at a higher price than 
their actual value, the difference constituting a charitable donation. However in some case, 
scammers put together false charities to steal the sale proceeds. 
9.  Oil and gas schemes: Investment scams involving speculation over oil and gas prices and 
promising unsophisticated investors high returns with no risk rising in frequency with 
predictions of oil shortages or a rise in gas prices.  
10. Equipment leasing: While the vast majority of equipment leasing deals are legitimate, scams 
exist where investors are offered high returns with no risk, while in reality high commissions 
paid to the intermediaries and promised returns have been unrealistically high.  
 
For more information, see: http://www.securities.state.ks.us/press/2002/topten8-26-02.html   
                                                 
34 NASAA 
35 In May 2003, the New York Attorney General’s office concluded a 10-month investigation into whether Merrill 
Lynch had issued misleading research reports by entering into a settlement agreement with the firm. Under the 
agreement, Merrill Lynch agreed to pay a $100 million fine and make significant changes to way it does business.   
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Appendix B:  SEC Regulations and Guidelines  per Information Security 
 
Recent laws enacted by the U.S. Congress impose considerable privacy and security 
requirements on health information, financial information, and Government information and 
systems.  They each require an enterprise approach to security, involving the senior management 
of the organization.  Cumulatively, they impact a large portion of private sector systems.  The 
two major laws directly impacting financial sector security programs are: 
 
1)  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
2)  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),
36 states that "each financial institution has an affirmative 
and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and 
confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information."
37  The GLBA definition of 
“financial institutions” encompasses banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other 
companies providing many types of financial products and services to consumers.  This includes 
lending, brokering or servicing any type of consumer loan; transferring and safeguarding money; 
preparing individual tax returns; providing financial advice or credit counseling; providing 
residential real estate settlement services; collecting consumer debts; and other types of financial 
services.
38  GLBA’s definition of financial institutions has even swept up colleges and 
universities.
39 
   
Pursuant to the GLBA, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and Federal financial regulatory bodies
40 have issued regulations requiring 
administrative, technical and physical safeguards for financial information.  The statute specifies 
that the regulations are intended: 
 
1)  To ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information; 
 
2)  To protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of 
such records; and 
 
3)  To protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which 
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.
41   
                                                 
36 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. Law 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), 
http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/resources/management/con-15usc_6801_6805-gramm_leach_bliley_act.pdf 
(hereinafter “GLBA”).  
37 GLBA, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/6801.html. 
38  “Financial Privacy: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act,” http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/. 
39 “Colleges and Universities Subject to New FTC Rules Safeguarding Customer Information,” NACUBO Advisory 
Report 2003-01, National Association of College and University Business Officers, Jan. 13, 2003, http://info-
center.ccit.arizona.edu/~security/GLBA_Summary.pdf.  
40 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Board 
of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the 
National Credit Union Administration. 
41 GLBA, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/6805.html.  
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The regulations set forth the required steps that must be taken, but they do not specify what the 
technical components of a safeguards program must be.  For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission requires that financial institutions under its purview must develop a plan in which 
the institution must: (1) designate one or more employees to coordinate the safeguards, (2) 
identify and assess the risks to customers’ information in each relevant area of the company's 
operation, and evaluate the effectiveness of the current safeguards for controlling these risks, (3) 
design and implement a safeguards program, and regularly monitor and test it, (4) select 
appropriate service providers and contract with them to implement safeguards, and (5) evaluate 
and adjust the program in light of relevant circumstances, including changes in the firms 
business arrangements or operations, or the results of testing and monitoring of safeguards.
42   
 
The SEC has historically emphasized the positive aspects of new technology, focusing on 
increased communications ability:  “The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 are premised on the philosophy that investors are best protected in making investment 
decisions if they are presented with full and accurate disclosure of all material information about 
investments.”
43  Accordingly, its guidelines and regulations regarding information security aim 
at ensuring easier access to and widespread adoption of new technology. A few examples 
include: 
 
Rule  Date  Title 
33-8410  4/21/2004  Mandated Electronic Filing for Form ID 
33-8230  5/7/2003  Mandated Electronic Filing and Website Posting for 
Forms 3, 4, and 5 
34-48167  7/11/2003  Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers; Amendments 
to Form ADV; Technical Amendments 
33-7472  10/24/1997  Rule to Provide That the Commission Will Not Accept 
Paper Filings That Are Required To Be Filed 
Electronically 
Release  Date  Title 
Securities Act Release No. 7233, 
Exchange Act Release No. 
36345 
10/6/1995  Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes 
Securities Act Release No. 7288, 
Exchange Act Release No. 
37182 
5/9/1996  Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer 
Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery of 
Information 
 
The SEC does address the impact of fraud on technology with the provisions it has adopted in 
the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
44 Title VIII, Section 1348 of the Act, entitled 
“Securities Fraud,” ensures that any person who tries to defraud another in connection with a 
security can be fined and/or imprisoned. Additionally Title XI, Section 105 of the Act deals with 
corporate fraud accountability and gives the SEC the authority to prohibit people from serving as 
                                                 
42 See “Financial Institutions and Customer Data: Complying with the Safeguards Rule,” 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/safeguards.htm. 
43 “Report to the Congress:  The Impact of Recent Technological Advances on the Securities Markets,” accessed at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm .  
44 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, accessed at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/SOact/soact.pdf.   
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corporate officers or directors. Pursuant to the Act, the SEC has adopted the following 
provisions: 
 
Section  Date  Rule Adopted 
302  8/27/2002  Requires CEOs and CFOs to certify financial and other information in their 
companies' quarterly and annual reports 
403  8/27/2002  Accelerates deadlines and mandates electronic filing of disclosures of 
insider transactions in company stock 
401(b)  1/15/2003  Regulation G: governs the use of non-GAAP financial measures, including 
disclosure and reconciliation requirements 
404  5/27/2003  Requires an annual management report on and auditor attestation of a 
company's internal controls over financial reporting 
Additionally, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (or Patriot Act) contains a provision against 
fraud in the securities markets. Pursuant to Section 326 of the Patriot Act, the SEC, in 
conjunction with the Treasury Department’s FinCEN, issued Rule 34-47752 entitled “Customer 
Identification Programs For Broker-Dealers.”
 Effective 6/9/2003, the rule “requires brokers or 
dealers to implement reasonable procedures to verify the identity of any person seeking to open 
an account, to the extent reasonable and practicable; to maintain records of the information used 
to verify the person's identity; and to determine whether the person appears on any lists of known 
or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to brokers or dealers by any 
government agency. This final regulation applies to brokers or dealers in securities except for 
brokers or dealers that register with the Securities and Exchange Commission solely because 
they effect transactions in securities futures products.”
45   
 
The Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) addresses the impact 
of privacy concerns on information security. Pursuant to section 504 of the Act, the SEC issued 
Rule 34-42974 entitled “Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P)” which 
implements notice requirements and restrictions on a financial institution's ability to disclose 
nonpublic personal information about consumers. Effective 11/13/2000, the Rule requires a 
financial institution to “provide its customers with a notice of its privacy policies and practices 
[nor] disclose nonpublic personal information about a consumer to nonaffiliated third parties 
unless the institution provides certain information to the consumer and the consumer has not 
elected to opt out of the disclosure.”
46 Finally, the Rule provides appropriate standards to protect 
customer information.  
?   Though the Sarbanes-Oxley, Patriot, and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Acts, and the related SEC 
provisions, pertain more to protection against fraud than protection against hacking, the SEC is 
attentive to the problems hacking can bring. A 2003 paper entitled “Sound Practices to 
Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System”
47 names four practices to ensure the 
resilience of the U.S. financial system:  (1) identify critical activities; (2) determine the 
appropriate recovery and resumption objectives; (3) maintain sufficient out-of-region resources 
                                                 
45 “Customer Identification Programs For Broker-Dealers,” accessed at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-
47752.htm.  
46 “Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P)” accessed at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-
42974.htm.  
47 “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System,” accessed at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm.    
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to meet recovery and resumption objectives; and (4) routinely use or test recovery and 
resumption arrangements. These practices focus on minimizing the immediate effects of a wide-
scale disruption on critical financial markets.   
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• Order information clear & 
accurate
• Increased customer control
• Immediate entry into clearing
• Instant order status & 
assignment information
 
Reduced Errors & Instant Feedback
• No more ‘analog’ errors:
– No voice confirmation of orders
– No handwriting to interpret





                                                 
48 This presentation was given by Samuel Gaer, CIO of the New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc, in New York at the 
IMN Wireless on Wallstreet Conference, July 29
th, 2004.  
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Lowers Costs & Increases Volume
• Lowers costs:
– Fewer errors
– No paper to supply
• Increases volume
– Automation improves performance
– Historical track record
















     






• Many valuable features 
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Appendix D:  Organizations Working to Establish Best Practice per Web Services Security 
 
E-finance is heavily reliant upon web services. Web services are one group of new technologies 
and standards for connecting to customers, exchanging data, and building applications across the 
Internet. Web services allow applications to communicate across platforms and programming 
languages using standard protocols based on XML. A number of organizations are attempting to 
develop best practice per web service security.  These consortiums are defining many of the 
infrastructure standards that enable Web services as well as the implementation standards that 
are used in specific communities and across industries. 
 
1.  Financial Services Technology Consortium  
http://www.fstc.org  
 
2.  The Liberty Alliance Project 
http://www.projectliberty.org/  
 
3.  The World Wide Web Consortium 
http://www.w3c.org  
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Appendix E: The 12 Layer Matrix 
 
Twelve core layers of proper security are essential for maintaining the integrity of data and 
mitigating the risks associated with open architecture environments, and in many instances, 
actual implementation of a specific layer need not entail large capital investments or outlays.  
The creation of the position of Chief information Security Officer (CISO), who oversees that the 
12 layers are carried out and implemented in accordance with the best, is essential in order to 
preserve the survivability of the network. 
 
1.  Risk Management—A broad based framework based upon CERT’s OCTAVE paradigm 
for managing assets and relevant risks to those assets. 
2.  Cyber-Intelligence-  Experienced threat and technical intelligence analysis  regarding 
threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and countermeasure should provide timely and 
customized reporting to prevent a security incident before it occurs. 
3.  Access Controls/Authentication—Establish the legitimacy of a node or user before 
allowing access to requested information. The first line of defense is access controls; 
these can be divided into passwords, tokens, biometrics, and public key infrastructure 
(PKI). 
4.  Firewalls—Create a system or combination of systems that enforces a boundary between 
two or more networks. 
5.  Active content filtering—At the browser level, it is prudent to filter all material that is 
not appropriate for the workplace or that is contrary to established workplace policies. 
6.  Intrusion detection system (IDS)—This is a system dedicated to the detection of break-
ins or break-in attempts, either manually or via software expert systems that operate on 
logs or other information available on the network. Approaches to monitoring vary 
widely, depending on the types of attacks that the system is expected to defend against, 
the origins of the attacks, the types of assets, and the level of concern for various types of 
threats. 
7.  Virus scanners—Worms, Trojans, and viruses are methods for deploying an attack. 
Virus scanners hunt malicious codes, but require frequent updating and monitoring. 
8.  Encryption—Encryption algorithms are used to protect information while it is in transit 
or whenever it is exposed to theft of the storage device (e.g. removable backup media or 
notebook computer). 
9.  Proper systems administration—This should be complete with a list of administrative 
failures that typically exist within financial institutions and corporations and a list of best 
practices. 
10.  Vulnerability testing—Vulnerability testing entails obtaining knowledge of 
vulnerabilities that exist on a computer system or network and using that knowledge to 
gain access to resources on the computer or network while bypassing normal 
authentication barriers. 
11.  Policy Management Software—a software program should control Bank policy and 
procedural guidelines vis-à-vis employee computer usage. 
12.  Business Continuity/Incident response plan (IRP)—This is the primary document used 
by a corporation to define how it will identify, respond to, correct, and recover from a 
computer security incident. The main necessity is to have an IRP and to test it 
periodically. 
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